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In 2013, at the height of the revelations about Edward Snowden and the
National Security Administration's spying on American citizens even on
American soil, a Texas company, Lavabit, and its founder Ladar Levison were
1
making a name for themselves as Mr. Snowden's email provider. Mr. Snowden
had chosen Lavabit because its encryption was extremely effective at protecting
2
the security of his emails. When consumers learned that Lavabit was good
enough for Mr. Snowden, some of them concluded that Lavabit was good enough
3
for them, leading to a spike in the email provider's subscribers.
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About four months after the FBI first approached Mr. Levison regarding
its investigation into Mr. Snowden, he closed Lavabit.4 Initially, the government
applied for a pen register from a United States magistrate judge, who granted the
order and enabled the government to collect real-time information about Mr.
Snowden. The magistrate judge further ordered that Lavabit provide any
necessary technical assistance to accomplish this task.5 Subsequently, the
government obtained a court order from the district judge requiring Lavabit to
provide its passwords, encryption keys, and computer code.6 Mr. Levison was
willing to surrender the encrypted data related to Mr. Snowden's email account,
as he had done several times in the past regarding criminal investigations, but he
concluded that giving the government all of the requested information would put
all of Lavabit's customers at risk.7
In the end, Mr. Levison closed Lavabit, and the government received
none of the information it was seeking about Mr. Snowden.8 The district court
held Lavabit and Mr. Levison in contempt. 9 They both appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which affirmed the district court.' 0
In the end, punishing Lavabit and Mr. Levison essentially destroyed Lavabit
because Mr. Levison decided that he could not protect Lavabit's subscribers in
the manner he represented to them."1 Consequently, he closed down Lavabit as
12
an email provider.
This Article addresses issues raised by the government's electronic
surveillance requests of Lavabit that resulted in the closing of the company.
Courts must safeguard individuals and companies from government overreach
that will jeopardize their well-being. In Part I, I discuss at length the facts of the
legal case involving the government's pen register application and the
subsequent orders, as well as the response by Lavabit and Mr. Levison. Part II
will unpack the legal analysis by the Fourth Circuit, discussing some of the
pertinent issues raised by the appellate decision. In Part III, I address the recent
dispute between Apple and the FBI as a comparison and contrast to the Lavabit

4
Ladar Levison, Secrets, Lies and Snowden's Email: Why I Was Forced to Shut Down
Lavabit,
GUARDIAN:
OPINION
(May
20,
2014,
7:30
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/20 14/may/20/why-did-lavabit-shut-down-snowdenemail.
5
In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d 276, 280-81 (4th Cir. 2014).
6
Nicole Perlroth & Scott Shane, As F.B.L PursuedSnowden, an E-Mail Service Stood Firm,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/03/us/snowdens-e-mail-provider-

discusses-pressure-from-fbi-to-disclose-data.html.
7
Hill, supra note 1; Perlroth & Shane, supra note 6.
8
Levison, supra note 4.
9
Id.
10

Id.

I

Id.
Id.

12
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case. Part IV will address the All Writs Act 3 and its applicability in these types
of actions. Finally, Part V seeks to demonstrate the lessons to be learned from
the San Bernardino shooting and Lavabit's troubles.
I.

THE RISE OF EDWARD SNOWDEN
AND THE FALL OF LAVABIT

In order to understand the demise of Lavabit, one must recall Edward
4
Snowden's release of classified National Security Agency documents.1 Those
revelations began on June 5, 2013.'5 Within the month, on June 28, 2013, a
federal magistrate judge in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia signed an order authorizing the government to place a pen
8
register 6 and a trap and trace device' 7 on Lavabit's system.' Specifically, the
government sought all metadata related to the email account of the target,
Edward Snowden, but none of the contents of any of the emails. 19 In other words,
the government was only authorized to obtain what has been analogously
described as the external envelope information, including "the how, when, and
where of the message." 2 °

13
14

28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2012).
See generally Perlroth & Shane, supra note 6.
Glenn Greenwald, NSA CollectingPhone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily,
15
GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013, 6:05 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phonerecords-verizon-court-order; see also Matthew Cole & Mike Brunker, Edward Snowden: A
Timeline, NBC NEWS, (May 26, 2014, 5:43 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/edwardsnowden-interview/edward-snowden-timeline-nl 14871.
A pen register essentially records the outgoing dialed numbers from a given telephone
16
number. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2012). It is defined as "a device or process which records or decodes
dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility from
which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted, provided, however, that such information
shall not include the contents of any communication[.]" Id.
A trap and trace device essentially records the incoming telephone numbers to a given
17
telephone number. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(4) (2012). It is defined as:
[A] device or process which captures the incoming electronic or other impulses
which identify the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing,
and signaling information reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or
electronic communication, provided, however, that such information shall not
include the contents of any communication[.]
Id.
18
19

In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d 276, 280-81 (4th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 281.
Orin S. Kerr, The Next Generation Communications Privacy Act, 162 U. PA. L. REv. 373,

20
384 (2014).
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Shortly after the government obtained this court order, FBI agents met
with Levison regarding the order.2 1 Lavabit provided encrypted email service
that was stored on its servers.22 However, access to these encrypted emails was
impossible without knowing a user's password because the messages were
protected by a user's public key, while the corresponding private key necessary
for decryption was secured by the user's password.2 3 The FBI sought to compel
the disclosure of the Lavabit TLS24 key, which would allow it to intercept
Snowden's password using a Man-in-the-Middle 25 attack. 6 With Snowden's
password, the FBI could reverse the encryption process.2 7
According to the FBI, Lavabit either refused to comply or indicated that
it was incapable of complying with the request because of Snowden's
encryption. 28 According to Lavabit, it was willing to allow the pen register and
trap and trace device to be installed on the system, but was uncomfortable in
surrendering to the FBI Lavabit's encryption key because it would have allowed
the FBI unfettered access to all of Lavabit's customers.2 9
After several days of discussions between Lavabit and the FBI, the
government sought another court order. 30 Another magistrate judge issued an
order compelling Lavabit comply with the original June 28, 2013 order. 31 On
July 9, 2013, the government then sought a show cause order directing Lavabit
and Levison to appear and explain why they had failed to comply with the June

21

DEF CON Conference, DEFCON 24-LadarLevison-CompelledDecryption: State of the

Art

in

Doctrinal

Perversity,

YouTUBE

(Nov.

3,

2016),

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQiDGH2OW6k.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
TLS stands for "Transport Layer Security," which is a cryptographic protocol used to
provide security on a computer network. See HOLLY LYNNE MCKINLEY, SSL AND TLS: A
BEGINNER'S GUIDE 8 (2003), https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/protocols/ssl-tlsbeginners-guide- 1029.
25
A Man-in-the-Middle attack is a method of eavesdropping by which a third party inserts
itself as a relay or proxy between the communications of two individuals, thus enabling the third
party to receive information that was never intended to be provided to it. Man in the Middle (MITM)
Attack, VERACODE, http://www.veracode.com/security/man-middle-attack (last visited Mar. 22,
2017).
26
DEF CON Conference, supra note 21.
27

Id.

In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d 276, 281 (4th Cir. 2014).
29
Ladar
Levison,
Victimize
/
Terrorized,
SPRINGFIELDDOH,
http://springfieldoh.ddns.net:47808/time%20wamer/a%20necessary%2Ohistory.html (last visited
Mar. 17, 2017).
30
See In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d at 281.
28

31

See id. at 280-81.
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28 order.32 In particular, the government accused Lavabit of stalling and ignoring
the FBI's repeated attempts to resolve the matter.33 Levison disputed the
government's assertion: "The government lawyers tried to overwhelm me. In the
first two weeks, I was served court orders a total of seven times leading to contact
with the FBI every other day. (This was the34 stretch a prosecutor would later
characterize as the 'long period of silence.')"
On July 13, 2013, when it became clear that the order was seeking
metadata, Lavabit offered to collect just the information itself and provide it to
the FBI. 35 However, the government rejected this offer. 36 On July 16, 2013, the
government obtained a seizure warrant requiring that Lavabit provide all
information for decrypting Snowden's Lavabit emails, "including encryption
keys and SSL keys. 37 This seizure warrant was not served on Levison.
At a July 16 show cause hearing before the district court, appearing pro
se, Levison testified that Lavabit had always agreed to comply with the
installation of the pen register.3 9 However, he objected to providing the
government with Lavabit's encryption keys because that would eviscerate the
system's overall security.4 0 After this July 16 hearing, Lavabit did install the pen
register, but much of the captured data was useless to the government because
the encryption rendered it largely indecipherable. 4 Conversely, Levison
indicated the login data was unusable, making it impossible to capture the
password, but in all likelihood they did capture metadata, because email
were not encrypted when traveling between
messages which contain 4metadata
2
time.
the
of
much
servers
A second hearing was scheduled to assess Lavabit's compliance, but
prior to that hearing, Levison and Lavabit filed a motion to quash the seizure
warrant.4 3 Specifically, they asserted "that the warrant (1) amounted to an
impermissible general warrant barred by the Fourth Amendment; (2) sought
immaterial information; and (3) imposed an undue burden on Lavabit's
business., 44 On August 1, 2013, the district court conducted a second hearing
32

See id. at 281-82.

33

See id.

34

38

Levison, supra note 29.
See In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d at 282.
Id.
Id. at 282-83.
See id. at 283.

39

See id.

40

See id.

41
42

See id.
Levison, supra note 29.

43

See In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d at 283.

44

Id.

35
36

37
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where it determined "that the Government would not collect all users' data, even
if the encryption keys would practically enable the Government to access all that
data. 4 5
After the August 1 hearing, Senior United States District Judge Claude
Hilton issued an order requiring Lavabit to provide the encryption keys to the
government as well as any necessary assistance to accomplish the goals of the
pen register order.4 6 Lavabit responded by "provid[ing] the FBI with an 11-page
printout containing largely illegible characters in 4-point type. 4 7 When Lavabit
refused to provide the key in electronic form, the government sought and
received sanctions of $5000 per day for non-compliance on August 5, 2013.48
Consequently, on August 7, 2013, Lavabit provided the FBI with the encryption
keys.49 Simultaneous to relinquishing the keys, Levison shut down Lavabit
because he felt that to do otherwise would violate his conscience:
I have been forced to make a difficult decision: to become
complicit in crimes against the American people or walk away
from nearly ten years of hard work by shutting down Lavabit.
After significant soul searching, I have decided to suspend
operations. I wish that I could legally share with you the events
that led to my decision. I cannot. I feel you deserve to know
what's going on-the first amendment is supposed to guarantee
me the freedom to speak out in situations like this.
Unfortunately, Congress has passed laws that say otherwise. As
things currently stand, I cannot share my experiences over the
last six weeks, even though I have twice made the appropriate
requests.5 °
Ultimately, the government was unable to intercept Snowden's password and
recover the encrypted messages stored on the Lavabit servers.51
II. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT REJECTS LAVABIT'S APPEAL
OF THE CIVIL CONTEMPT ORDER

In response to the civil contempt order issued by Senior Judge Hilton,
Lavabit filed an appeal of the civil contempt order, seeking a decision extricating

46

Id. at 284.
See id.

47

Id.

48

See id.

45

49

See id.
Levison, supra note 29; see also In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d at 284 n. 11.
51
Kim Zetter, Encrypted Email Service Once Used by Edward Snowden Edward Snowden
Relaunches, INTERCEPT (Jan. 20, 2017, 12:57 PM), https://theintercept.com/2017/01/20/encryptedemail-service-once-used-by-edward-snowden-to-relaunch/.
50
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it from the. legal consequences of the order. 52 Ultimately, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the civil contempt order finding that
Lavabit had not properly preserved its claims for appeal or waived them. 53 In
arguing his position against providing the government with Lavabit's encryption
keys, Levison said "I have only ever objected to turning over the SSL keys
because that would compromise all of the secure communications in and out of
my network, including my own administrative traffic. 5 4 The Fourth Circuit
found this statement too vague and tenuous to form a legal issue before the court.
In order to preserve an issue for appeal, a litigant must be specific so as to put
the district court on notice that a party was challenging the matter.5 5 Here, the
court concluded that "[n]either the district court nor the Government therefore
had any signal from Lavabit that it contested the district court's authority56under
the Pen/Trap Statute to enter the Pen/Trap Order or the June 28th Order."
Next, Lavabit argued that it was induced or invited to waive its appeal
57
regarding the encryption keys by the district court and the government.
However, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Lavabit was aware that the June 28
order concerned encryption keys and thus could not have been induced or invited
to waive the issue.58 Ultimately, the court held that Lavabit abandoned any
argument that it did not raise before the trial court and cannot raise anew on
appeal.59
Levison maintains that some of the difficulty that Lavabit faced was his
inability to hire counsel that understood both the law and the technology
involved:
Because the whole case was under seal, I couldn't admit to
anyone who wasn't a lawyer that I needed help, let alone why.
In the days before my appearance I would spend hours repeating
the facts of the case to a dozen attorneys, as I sought someone
else that was qualified to represent me.6 °
Indeed, he appeared at his first hearing pro se because his first attorney was
unable to attend.61 Even when he was able to retain counsel, there were several
difficult issues:

52

See In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d at 284.

53

See id. at 288.

54

Id. at 287.

55

See id. at 287-88.

56

Id. at 288.

57

See id.

58

See id. at 288-89.

59

See id. at 292-93.
Levison, supra note 29.
In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d at 283.

60
61
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I retained a small local law firm before returning home, and they
took on the task of assembling a legal strategy and filing briefs
in the few short days available. The court barred them from
consulting outside experts, making it difficult to understand the
complex legal and technological issues involved. Even a request
to discuss the case with members of Congress was denied. To
make matters worse, the court wouldn't deliver transcripts for
my first appearance for another two months. My legal team was
forced to proceed without access to information they needed.62
Finally, Judge Hilton found Levison in civil contempt at an ex parte proceeding.63
III. THE DISPUTE BETWEEN APPLE AND THE FBI
INITIALLY RAISES CONCERNS SIMILAR TO ISSUES FACED BY LAVABIT

In order to better understand the Lavabit case, it is important to
understand what the government did and did not use in pursuing the information
that it sought from Lavabit. Specifically, the government based its legal authority
to obtain the encryption keys on three sources: 64 a grand jury subpoena, which
was subsequently withdrawn; 65 the language regarding technical assistance in the
67
pen register and trap and trace statutes; 66 and the Stored Communications Act.
Arguments regarding the latter two bases were waived. The Fourth Circuit notes
that there are differences between the pen register statute and the trap and trace
statute insofar as the latter requires technical assistance in both the installation
and the operation of the device whereas the former requires technical assistance
in just the installation.68
Notably absent from the government's arsenal in the Lavabit case was
the All Writs Act, which Congress enacted in 1789, authorizing "[t]he Supreme
Court and all courts established by Act of Congress [to] issue all writs necessary
or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages
and principles of law."' 69 The All Writs Act played a central role in a more recent
case involving the government's electronic surveillance and demands for thirdparty assistance: the dispute between Apple and the FBI.
In December 2015, Syed Rizwan Farook and his wife Tashfeen Malik
participated in a mass shooting at his workplace in San Bernardino, California,

63

Levison, supra note 29.
See id.; see also In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d at 284.

64

Levison, supra note 29.

65

See In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d at 289.

66

18 U.S.C. § 3124 (2012).

67
68

See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-12 (2012).
See In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d at 291-92.

69

28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2012).

62
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killing 14 people. 70 This attack would no doubt have garnered significant
attention by the FBI, but because Malik declared her allegiance to ISIS prior to
her death in the attack,7' the FBI's scrutiny was heightened.
When he died, Farook had an iPhone 5c running iOS Version 9
Operating System, which the FBI wanted to access.7 His employer, the San
Bernardino County Public Health Department, provided him with this cell phone
and also authorized the FBI to access it during the course of its investigation.73
Unfortunately, Farook had previously set his iPhone so that one needed a fourdigit password to access it. 74 Moreover, attempting to randomly enter numbers
to ascertain the correct password could cause the iPhone to erase all its data once
agents had reached a preset number of failed password attempts.7 5
In February 2016, the FBI requested for Apple to help it accessing
Farook's iPhone and thus his data.7 6 However, Apple did not cooperate in a
manner that satisfied the FBI, so it obtained a federal court order requiring Apple
to assist the FBI in accessing Farook's cell phone.77
Apple and the FBI also waged a war of words promoting their positions
in the legal battle. Tim Cook, Apple CEO, published an open letter to its
customers condemning the FBI's tactics as a "dangerous precedent":
We have great respect for the professionals at the FBI, and we
believe their intentions are good. Up to this point, we have done
everything that is both within our power and within the law to
help them. But now the U.S. government has asked us for
something we simply do not have, and something we consider
too dangerous to create. They have asked us to build a backdoor

70

Adam Nagourney, Ian Lovett & Richard Perez-Pena, San Bernardino Shooting Kills at

Least

14;

Two

Suspects

Are

Dead,

N.Y.

TIMES

(Dec.

2,

2015),

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/03/us/san-bemardino-shooting.html?_r=0; Pat St. Claire, Greg
Botelho & Ralph Ellis, San Bernardino Shooter Tashfeen Malik: Who Was She?, CNN (Dec. 8,
2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/06/us/san-bemardino-shooter-tashfeen-malik/.
71
Claire, Botelho & Ellis, supra note 70.

72
Joel Rubin, James Queally & Paresh Dave, FBI Unlocks San Bernardino Shooter's iPhone
and Ends Legal Battle with Apple, for Now, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2016, 10:39 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-In-fbi-drops-fight-to-force-apple-to-unlock-sanbemardino-terrorist-iphone-20160328-story.html.

73 Atoosa Moinzadeh, FBI Approved Hack that Complicated Access to San Bernardino
Shooter's iPhone Data, VICE NEWS (Feb. 21, 2016, 3:35 PM), https://news.vice.com/article/fbiapproved-hack-that-complicated-access-to-san-bemardino-shooters-iphone-data.
74
Rubin, Queally & Dave, supra note 72.
75
Moinzadeh, supra note 73.
76

Id.

77
In re Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a
Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203, No. ED 15-0451M, 2016 WL 618401,
at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016) (issuing an order compelling Apple, Inc. to assist agents in search).
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to the iPhone.
Specifically, the FBI wants us to make a new version of the
iPhone operating system, circumventing several important
security features, and install it on an iPhone recovered during
the investigation. In the wrong hands, this software-which
does not exist today-would have the potential to
unlock any iPhone in someone's physical possession.
The FBI may use different words to describe this tool, but make
no mistake: Building a version of iOS that bypasses security in
this way would undeniably create a backdoor. And while the
government may argue that its use would be limited to this case,
there is no way to guarantee such control.7 8
Not to be outdone, James Comey, the FBI Director, issued a responsive press
release asserting that the FBI's assistance request was necessary:
The particular legal issue is actually quite narrow. The relief we
seek is limited and its value increasingly obsolete because the
technology continues to evolve. We simply want the chance,
with a search warrant, to try to guess the terrorist's passcode
without the phone essentially self-destructing and without it
taking a decade to guess correctly. That's it. We don't want to
break anyone's encryption or set a master key loose on the land.
I hope thoughtful people will take the time to understand that.
Maybe the phone holds the clue to finding more terrorists.
Maybe it doesn't. But we can't look the survivors in the eye, or
ourselves in the mirror, if we don't follow this lead.

So I hope folks will remember what terrorists did to innocent
Americans at a San Bernardino office gathering and why the FBI
simply must do all we can under the law to investigate that. And
in that sober spirit, I also hope all Americans will participate in
the long conversation we must have about how to both embrace
the technology we love and get the safety we need.7 9
These two statements set up a public debate between a large American
technology company and the chief federal law enforcement agency.

78

Tim

Cook,

A

Message

to

Our

Customers,

APPLE

(Feb.

16,

2016),

http://www.apple.com/customer-letter/.
79
James Comey, FBI Director Comments on San Bernardino Matter, FBI (Feb. 21, 2016),
https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-director-comments-on-san-bernardinomatter.
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Then as quickly as it began, it was more or less over. On March 28, 2016,
the FBI informed the district court Apple's assistance was no longer necessary
because it had "successfully accessed the data stored on Farook's iPhone. 8 °
Apparently, the FBI had been able to breach Apple's security system for
Farook's iPhone with the assistance of a hacker who was paid at least $1.3
million for the work.8 1
IV. THE FBI SOUGHT TO USE THE ALL WRITS ACT
IN ITS DISPUTE WITH APPLE

If the hacker had been unsuccessful, then the FBI would have continued
with its argument that the All Writs Act authorized the district court to require
Apple to assist the FBI. 82 However, according to the Supreme Court, the Act
provides for an extraordinary writ that should be used only in an extraordinary
circumstance.8 3 The Court has further explained in analyzing this writ that while
the "Act empowers federal courts to fashion extraordinary remedies when the
need arises, it does not authorize them to issue ad hoc writs whenever compliance
with statutory procedures appears inconvenient or less appropriate. 84
In UnitedStates v. New York Telephone Company,85 the Supreme Court
analyzed the All Writs Act, and found that a district court could require a
telephone company to provide the government telephone numbers pursuant to a
pen register based on the writ.86 In focusing on whether the All Writs Act can be
used in conjunction with a pen register, the Court determined "that the power of
federal courts to impose duties upon third87parties is not without limits [as]
unreasonable burdens may not be imposed.,
In the FBI's dispute with Apple regarding assistance decrypting
Farook's iPhone, the government expected Apple's cooperation, in part, because
it had received assistance with other Apple devices. By one account, Apple had

Katie Benner & Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Says It Has Unlocked iPhone Without Apple, N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/29/technology/apple-iphone-fbi-justicedepartment-case.html?_r-0.
81 Id.; Julia Edwards, FBI PaidMore than $1.3 Million to Break into San BernardinoiPhone,
REUTERS (Apr. 22, 2016, 1:47 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-encryption-fbiidUSKCNOXI2IB.
82
See Benner & Lichtblau, supra note 80.
83
Platt v. Minn. Min.& Mfg. Co., 376 U.S. 240, 245 (1964) (quoting Ex parte Fahey, 332
80

TIMES (Mar. 28, 2016),

U.S. 258, 260 (1947)).
84
Pa. Bureau of Corr. v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 43 (1985).
85
434 U.S. 159, 176 (1977).
86
87

See id. at 174-76.
Id. at 172.
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assisted the government in accessing iPhones on at least 70 occasions.8 8 A few
recent federal orders by federal magistrate judges support the contention that
89
Apple had been more cooperative regarding assisting federal law enforcement.
In filing these applications, Assistant United States Attorneys would represent to
the courts that other courts have granted similar orders and Apple has complied:
"The government is aware, and can represent, that in other cases, courts have
ordered the unlocking of an iPhone under this authority [i.e., the All Writs Act].
Additionally, Apple has routinely complied with such orders." 90 However, these
California cases simply mandated "that Apple shall provide reasonabletechnical
assistanceto enable law enforcement agents to obtain access to unencrypted data
("Data") on the Device." 91 More important, the courts "further ordered that, to
the extent that data on the iOS device is encrypted, Apple may provide a copy of
the encrypted data to law enforcement but Apple is not required to attempt to
decrypt, or otherwise enable law enforcement's attempts to access any encrypted
data., 92 In other words, the approach that the FBI took in the case of Farook's
iPhone was not the same as that in previous cases. Instead, the FBI was
demanding more than "reasonable technical assistance" in providing
unencrypted data in seeking to compel Apple to decrypt Farook's iPhone.
The FBI's demands on Apple regarding the San Bernardino case were
problematic not only because of the new approach, but because it would likely
have violated the All Writs Act. The Supreme Court, in discussing the All Writs
Act, has explained that "the power of federal courts to impose duties upon third

88
Evan Perez, DOJ: Apple Has Routinely Helped Law Enforcement-UntilRecent Publicity,
CNN (Feb. 23, 2016, 10:57 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/23/politics/apple-justicedepartment/.
89
In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. to Assist in the Execution of a Search Warrant Issued by
this Court, No. 5:14-CR-90470 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2014) (order requiring Apple to assist agents in
Apple iOS device search); In re Order Requiring [XXX], Inc. to Assist in the Execution of a Search
Warrant Issued by this Court by Unlocking a Cellphone, No. 14 Mag. 2258, 2014 WL 5510865
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2014); In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. to Assist in the Execution of a Search
Warrant Issued by this Court, No. 4:14-CR-90812 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2014) (order requiring Apple
to assist agents in iPhone search).
90
In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. to Assist in the Execution of a Search Warrant Issued by
this Court, No. 4:14-CR-90812 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2014) (application order requiring Apple to
assist agents in iPhone search).
91
In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. to Assist in the Execution of a Search Warrant Issued by
this Court, No. 5:14-CR-90470 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2014) (order requiring Apple to assist agents in
Apple iOS device search) (emphasis added); accordIn re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. to Assist in
the Execution of a Search Warrant Issued by this Court, No. 4:14-CR-90812 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3,
2014) (order requiring Apple to assist agents in iPhone search).
92
In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. to Assist in the Execution of a Search Warrant Issued by
this Court, No. 4:14-CR-90812 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2014) (order requiring Apple to assist agents in
iPhone search); accord In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. to Assist in the Execution of a Search
Warrant Issued by this Court, No. 5:14-CR-90470 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2014) (order requiring Apple
to assist agents in Apple iOS device search).
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parties is not without limits.

'93

Specifically, the Court determined that any order

pursuant to the All Writs Act cannot inflict "[u]nreasonable burdens" on the third
party. 94 If the dispute between the FBI and Apple regarding Farook's iPhone had
proceeded, Apple likely would have argued that the FBI's request was
unreasonably burdensome in that it was not able to readily decrypt the
sophisticated level of operating software that the phone was using. Moreover,
even if it could decrypt it, that endeavor would take countless employee hours
and costs as well as destroy Apple's security for its operating software. Such
consequences must be acknowledged as too burdensome.
In a case similar to Apple's dispute and analogous to Lavabit's
circumstances, the government sought a court order mandating that Apple assist
95
DEA agents to bypass the security regarding the iPhone user's password. In
analyzing the government's application, a federal magistrate first notes that the
statute has three requirements for an order compelling Apple to circumvent its
security to provide the DEA with the iPhone's password:
(1)
(2)
(3)

issuance of the writ must be "in aid of' the issuing
court's jurisdiction;
the type of writ requested must be "necessary or
appropriate" to provide such aid to the issuing court's
jurisdiction; and
the issuance of the writ 96must be "agreeable to the usages
and principles of law."

If the government's application meets all three of these requirements, then the
exercise the discretion to grant the application, but is not
presiding judge may
97
SO.
do
to
required
In discussing the first requirement, the magistrate judge determined that
an order compelling Apple to circumvent its security to provide the DEA with
98
the iPhone's password would aid in the court's jurisdiction. Moreover, he
concluded that this type of order was necessary or appropriate in aiding the

93

United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 172 (1977); accordIn re Order Requiring

[XXX], Inc. to Assist in the Execution of a Search Warrant Issued by this Court by Unlocking a
Cellphone, 2014 WL 5510865, at *2 (S.D.N.Y Oct. 31, 2014).

94 N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 172; accordIn re Order Requiring [XXX], Inc. to Assist in the
Execution of a Search Warrant Issued by this Court by Unlocking a Cellphone, 2014 WL 5510865,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y Oct. 31, 2014).

95 In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. to Assist in the Execution of a Search Warrant Issued by
this Court, 149 F. Supp. 3d 341 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
Id. at 350.
96
See id. at 351;see also N.Y Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 176-77.
See In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. to Assist in the Execution of a Search Warrant Issued
98
by this Court, 149 F. Supp. 3d at 351-52.
97
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court's jurisdiction.99 However, the judge ultimately found that such an order
would not be "agreeable to the usages and principles of law."100 In the end, the
magistrate judge denied a similar type of request that would have been less
intrusive than the one sought in the San Bernardino case.
V. HOW DO LAVABIT AND THE APPLE DISPUTE OVER
THE SAN BERNARDINO SHOOTING RELATE TO EACH OTHER?

Why does all of this matter to Lavabit? On some level, it doesn't.
Lavabit's secured email services have been shuttered for over three years. The
damage has been done and is likely permanent.
On the other hand, it is important to understand the similarities and
differences between the circumstances surrounding Lavabit and the situation for
Apple. Lavabit was a relatively small operation serving at most a little over
400,000 subscribers. Apple is a large multinational corporation that may be the
technology equivalent of too big to fail. Lavabit was too small to fight back in
any meaningful way when the government came calling.
In many ways, Lavabit would have theoretically been better off if the
government had sought to compel Lavabit's assistance in decrypting Snowden's
password pursuant to the All Writs Act. In such a case, Lavabit would have been
entitled to a hearing. Indeed, because the Fourth Circuit affirmed the civil
contempt order finding that Lavabit had essentially waived all challenges to it,
there was unfortunately no resolution to the underlying legal questions about the
basis for requiring Lavabit to assist the government.
More important, if the standard applied by the court concerned the
burdensomeness that Lavabit would experience in handing over its encryption
keys to government, then the outcome would likely be different. As several cases
concerning the All Writs Act established, orders requiring a provider to assist in
access to unencrypted data are permissible while mandating assistance to decrypt
is generally not permissible.10 1 In the end, Lavabit and other smaller providers
like it are vulnerable to the government in a way that Apple might not be, which
can defend itself should the government continue to rely on the All Writs Act.
VI. CONCLUSION

In the heat of the moment, the government went after Lavabit with
everything that it could bring to bear on the company. Indeed, it convinced the
courts that Lavabit was acting in contempt. No doubt, the government was
desperate to obtain information about Snowden and use that information to
capture him. In hindsight, all of those efforts failed. In the end, Snowden moved

99

Id. at 352.

100

Id. at 362-63.
See supra Part IV.
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from Hong Kong to Russia where he still lives today avoiding extradition to the
United States10 2 and potentially cooperating with his Russian handlers.
On the other hand, Lavabit closed for over three years, losing significant
revenue. 10 3 Moreover, in its closing the government missed its opportunity to
obtain the information that it sought originally. The government insisted that
Lavabit fully cooperate on its own terms instead of working with Lavabit and
Mr. Levison to get the information that it sought. If the government cannot
change its approach, they will lose valuable information from the next Lavabit
or from larger corporations like Apple.

See Jane Onyanga-Omara & Gregory Korte, EdwardSnowden 's Residence Permit in Russia
Extended by a "Couple of Years", USA TODAY (Jan. 18, 2017, 6:22 AM),
www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/01/18/russia-extends-edward-snowdens-residencepermit/96709018/.
103 LAVABIT, https://lavabit.com/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2017).
102
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